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JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section

78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code

Annotated (herein "U.C.A.").
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Each of the issues being a question of law, the appropriate
standard of review is de novo
1.

Did

the

trial

review by the Court of Appeals.

court

correctly

take

judicial

notice

regarding the location of a numerical address?
2.

Is venue an essential element of the offense and may it

be established by a preponderance of the evidence?
3.

Did Appellant's failure to object prior to trial waive

his rights to contest venue?
4.

Does Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., conflict with Section

76-1-501(3), U.C.Ao, and due process requirements concerning proof
on the issue of venue?
5.

Does

76-1-501(3),

Section
U.C.A.,

76-1-202(1),
unconstitutional

U.C.A.,
as

render

violative

Section
of

the

requirement that all facts constituting a crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt?

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES

Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-202(2);
76-1-202. Venue of actions.
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a
defendant unless made before trial.
(Full text of Section 76-1-202 attached as Exhibit A. )
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-501:
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the offense"
defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the
defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense"
mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of
the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements
of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201:
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of
adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary.
A court may take judicial notice,
whether requested or not.
(Full text of Rule 201 attached as Exhibit B.)

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
West Valley City accepts Appellant Flower's presentation of
the nature of the case.
RELEVANT FACTS
1.

Flower was charged, by citation (R-l) and by Information

(R-16, 17; Exhibit C ) , with violating Section 41-6-44,

U.C.A.,

"Driving under the influence of alcohol," and Section 41-6-45,
U.C.A., "Reckless driving."
2.

The Information alleged that both offenses occurred at

3596 West 3100 South in West Valley City, State of Utah.

(R-16,

17; Exhibit C)
3.

Prior to trial, Flower made no motions or objections

regarding the venue of the trial.
4.

The matter was heard

as a bench

trial

in the

Third

Circuit Court, West Valley Department, on January 13, 199 3, before
the Honorable William A. Thorne.
5.

Two

witnesses

were

(R-5)

presented

by

the

prosecution

—

Colleen Hansen, a private citizen, and Officer Black, a West Valley
City Police Department Patrol Officer.
witnesses.
6.

The defense presented no

(R-81; Exhibit D)
Neither witness directly testified that the offense of

driving under the influence occurred within the limits of West
Valley City.
7•

(R-81; Exhibit D)

Witness Hansen testified that the offense occurred at her

place of employment, which was located at 3596 West 3100 South.
(R-82; Exhibit D)
3

8.

The

trial

court,

based

upon

the

address

evidence

presented by Witness Hansen, took judicial notice at the time of
the trial that the address of 3596 West 3100 South is located
within West Valley City.

This finding was based upon the following

findings of the trial court:
a.

The

court

found

that

it was

familiar

with

the

location of the address of 3596 West 3100 South and knew it to be
within West Valley City limits.
b.

(R-82; Exhibit D)

The address is unique, and there is not another 3596

West 3100 South within Salt Lake County.
c.
located

near

(R-82; Exhibit D)

The court found that 3596 West 3100 South is not
the

border

of

West

Valley

City

or

any

other

jurisdiction; but, rather, is located near the center of West
Valley City.
d.

(R-82; Exhibit D)
The court found the address of 3596 West 3100 South

to be generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court to be within West Valley City.
9.

(R-82; Exhibit D)

At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence and

arguments, the court found Flower guilty of driving under the
influence of alcohol and not guilty of reckless driving.
75)

4

(R-74,

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE
THAT 3596 WEST 3100 SOUTH IS WITHIN WEST
VALLEY CITY.
The trial court correctly took judicial notice at the time of
trial that the address of 3596 West 3100 South is located within
West Valley City.

Rule

201(b) of the Utah Rules of

governs the taking of judicial notice.

Evidence

A court is presumed to know

what is generally known or what a person of ordinary intelligence
would know.

In the instant case, the location of 3596 West 3100

South is precisely the type of fact the court could take judicial
notice of.

First, its location is generally known within the

territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
allows

for

accurate

and

ready

Second, the address

determination.

The

rational

conclusion for the trial court to draw was that the offense was
committed in the location as alleged in the Information.

Several

other states allow courts to take judicial notice of streets and
buildings.
POINT 2
VENUE IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE
AND
MAY
BE
ESTABLISHED
BY
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON A PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE STANDARD.
Utah case law and the Criminal Code clearly set forth that
venue is not an essential element of the offense and must only be
established

by

a

preponderance

of

the

evidence.

Section

76-1-501(3), U.C.A., clearly states, "The existence of jurisdiction
5

and venue are not elements of the offense but shall be established
by a preponderance of the evidence."

Furthermore, the judicial

notice taken clearly meets the preponderance of evidence standard.
POINT 3
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CONTEST
VENUE, SINCE HE DID NOT OBJECT PRIOR TO TRIAL
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 76-1-202(2), U.C.A.
Appellant Flower has waived his opportunity to contest venue.
Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., clearly states that any objection must
be made before trial.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that even in

criminal cases a defendant can waive any objection to venue.

In

this case, Flower did not object before trial; therefore, Flower
cannot be heard to raise the objection on appeal.
POINT 4
SECTION 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., DOES NOT CONFLICT
WITH SECTION 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., OR WITH DUE
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING PROOF ON THE
ISSUE OF VENUE.
Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., pertains to procedure; it does
not

pertain

to

guilt.

Venue

does

not

determine

guilt;

it

determines the place where the suit may or should be heard and can
be waived by the defendant if no timely objection is made.
76-1-501(3),

U.C.A.,

states

that

venue

is

not

an

Section

element

of

criminal offenses and that it be established by a preponderance of
the evidence.
Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., and Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A.,
clearly

do

not

conflict.

Flower's

argument

is

based

on

the

incorrect legal principle that the venue statute deals with guilt.
6

POINT 5
THE VENUE PROVISIONS IN SECTION 76-1-202(1),
U.C.A., DO NOT RENDER SECTION 76-1-501(3),
U.C.A., UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF THE
REQUIREMENT THAT ALL OF THE FACTS CONSTITUTING
A CRIME MUST BE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
Section 76-1-202(1), U.C.A., sets forth the procedural rules
for determining proper venue and does not make venue an element of
the crime.

However, Appellant Flower is forced to argue that the

intent of the legislature was to make venue an essential element of
the crime in order to challenge the constitutionality of Sections
76-1-202(1) and 76-1-501(3), U.C.A.
unfounded assumptions.

Flower's argument is based on

Venue is not an element of the offense and

can be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

Furthermore,

Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A,, in no way shifts the burden of proving
guilt from the prosecution to the defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE
THAT 3596 WEST 3100 SOUTH IS WITHIN WEST
VALLEY CITY.
The trial court correctly took judicial notice at the time of
trial that the address of 3596 West 3100 South is located within
West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah.

The rule governing

judicial notice of adjudicated facts is set forth in Rule 201(b) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence, which states:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either
(1)
generally
known
within
the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
7

(2)
capable
of
accurate
and
ready
determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.
Utah R. Evid. 201.

A court is presumed to know what is generally

known or what a person of ordinary intelligence would know.
In the instant case, the location of 3596 West 3100 South is
precisely the type of fact that is appropriate for the trial court
to take judicial notice of.

The location is generally known within

the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.

And the trial

court found that it was personally familiar with the location (R82; Exhibit D) .

The court also found the address to be unique

within Salt Lake County and to be near the center of West Valley
City, rather than near any border.

(R-82; Exhibit D)

Flower contends that the trial court erred in taking judicial
notice because there was no direct evidence that the address is in
Salt Lake County or West Valley City, despite the direct testimony
that the offense occurred at 3596 West and 3100.
Brief, p. 7.)

(Appellant's

However, the trial court does not have to presume

less than general intelligence, and under the circumstances it
would have been naive to say that 3596 West and 3100 South is an
indefinite

location not within West Valley

City or Salt

Lake

County.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in People

v. Pride,

156 N.E.2d 551

(111. 1959), addressed the issue upon reviewing a case in which
testimony was given that a crime was committed at a particular
address, but in which no direct evidence was given as to the city
or county.

The court noted that when people are referring to a

8

street within the city in which they live, they commonly refer only
to the street.

Conversely, when they are referring to a street in

a different city, they will also name the city.

Specifically, the

court reasoned:
Describing a location by street and number is
so much a part of our every day life that it
cannot be ignored.
A witness's testimony
should not be considered in a vacuum divorced
from our general knowledge as to the manner in
which things are said.
And, so, common
experience dictates that a witness testifying
in Chicago, when speaking of 8900 S. Anthony
Avenue, is speaking of 89 00 S. Anthony Avenue
in Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, although
there may very well be an 8900 S. Anthony
Avenue in some city other than Chicago, in
some county other than Cook and in some state
other than Illinois,
Pride,

156 N.E.2d at 554, 555.
As

a

result,

although

there

was

no

direct

evidence

to

establish in which city, county, or state the crime occurred, the
court held the record sufficient to prove venue of the crime.

In

the present case, Witness Hansen testified in West Valley City that
the offense occurred at her place of employment, which was located
at 3596 West 3100 South.

The rational conclusion for the trial

court to draw was that the offense was committed in the location
alleged in the Information.

Several other states also allow courts
See

to take judicial notice of streets and buildings.
Nelson,

543 So. 2d 1058 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1989); State

442 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. App. 1989); State
(Mo. App. 1988); People

v.

Hosney,

1962) .

9

v.

Spain,

State
v.

v.

Larsen,

759 S.W.2d 871

22 Cal. Rptr. 397 (Cal. App.

Flower relies on the holding of In
P. 2d 699

re

Phillips

Estate,

44

(Utah 1935), a probate case, for the proposition that

judicial notice of an address is improper.

However, he completely

misstates the facts when he states, "The Supreme Court held that
the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the fact that
University Avenue and Center Street are in Provo."
Brief, p. 8.)

In In re Phillips

Estate,

(Appellant's

the Supreme Court was not

setting aside judicial notice of a lower court. No trial court had
taken judicial notice concerning the location of the streets.

The

Supreme Court was refusing to take judicial notice at the appellate
stage of the proceedings.
present case.

That is clearly not on point with the

The Supreme Court stated, "We cannot take judicial

notice that these streets are in Provo or that they are actually
within 80 yards of each other."

(Emphasis added.)

Instead, the

Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court for further
proceedings.
Phillips

Estate

In re

Phillips

Estate,

444 P. 2d at 704, 705.

In

re

certainly does not prohibit a trial court from

taking judicial notice of the location of an address.
The trial court correctly took judicial notice at the time of
trial that the address of 3596 West 3100 South is located within
West Valley City.

10

POINT 2
VENUE IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE
AND
MAY
BE
ESTABLISHED
BY
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON A PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE STANDARD.

In State

v. Bailey,

282 P. 2d 339 (Utah 1955), the Utah Supreme

Court ruled on a case very similar to the instant case.
the witness testified that the offense

Bailey,

In

(which was also "driving

under the influence") had been committed at Roller Mill Hill, yet
there was no direct proof that the offense was committed within
Garfield County.
v. Mitchell,

The Supreme Court quoted an earlier case,

State

278 P.2d 618 (Utah 1955), and stated:
Some jurisdictions require that, in criminal
cases, where venue is in issue, it must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and others
by a preponderance.
Some
authorities,
including this court, permit venue to be
established inferentially by circumstantial
evidence. We believe and hold that, however
it is proved, it must
be done by a
preponderance of the evidence only and not
beyond a reasonable doubt, since venue is not
an element of the offense, and there seems to
be no reason to require the same quantum and
quality of proof to prove venue as is required
to prove such elements.

Mitchell,

Bailey,

278 P. 2d at 620. From the testimony presented in

the Supreme Court determined that it could reasonably be inferred
that the offense was committed in Garfield County.

Bailey,

282

P.2d at 341.
In addition, the Criminal Code clearly sets forth that venue
is not part of the state's case and must only be established by a
preponderance

of

the

evidence.

Section

76-1-501(3),

U.C.A.,

states, "The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements
11

of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of the
evidence. "
The judicial notice taken clearly meets the preponderance of
See

evidence standard.
1988); People

v.

State

Hosney,

v. Spain,

759 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. App.

22 Cal. Rptr. 397 (Cal. App. 1962).

In

fact, in other jurisdictions which require that venue be proved
beyond

a

standard

reasonable
was

met

doubt, courts

by

taking

geographical locations.
App. 1989); and State

v.

have held

judicial

See State

notice

v. Larsen,

Williams,

that
of

this

higher

addresses

and

442 N.W.2d 840 (Minn.

474 So. 2d 23 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1985) .
POINT 3
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CONTEST
VENUE, SINCE HE DID NOT OBJECT PRIOR TO TRIAL
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 76-1-202(2), U.C.A.
Section
improper
before

76-1-202(2),

U.C.A.r

states,

"All

objections

to

place of trial are waived by a defendant unless made

trial."

Flower did not object

to venue before

trial.

Therefore, Flower has waived his objection and cannot raise it on
appeal.
In considering the venue issue, the United States

Supreme

Court ruled that "the right to have a case heard in the court of
the

proper

Industrial

venue

Addition

may

Ass'n

be

lost

unless

v. Commissioner of Internal

U.S. 310, 65 S. Ct. 289, 89 L. Ed. 260.
Supreme

Court

has

seasonably

specifically

held

12

that

asserted."

Revenue,

323

Furthermore, the Utah
Section

76-1-202(2),

U.C.A., applies to criminal defendants and that their failure to
raise venue prior to trial waives their later objections.
State

In

v.

Lovell,

758 P. 2d

909

(Utah

1988),

the court

stated:
Utah law requires that a defendant be tried in
the county where the crime(s) occurred.2
However, all objections of improper place of
trial are waived by a defendant unless made
before trial.3 In this case, defendant made no
objection to venue, and therefore he waived
any objection thereto.
Lovell,

758 P.2d at 911.

Dunbar,

665 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1983); State

(Footnotes omitted.)
v.

See also

Cauble,

State

v.

563 P.2d 775

(Utah 1977) (the right to be tried in the county where the crime
occurred "is a personal

privilege

which can be waived by failing to

make a proper objection").
POINT 4
SECTION 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., DOES NOT CONFLICT
WITH SECTION 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., OR WITH DUE
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING PROOF ON THE
ISSUE OF VENUE.
Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., and Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A.,
are not in conflict.

According to Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., a

defendant waives any right to object that the place of trial is
improper

if

76-1-501(3),

venue

is

U.C.A.,

not

contested

requires

preponderance of the evidence.
is proper

can object.

each

other and

set

venue

be

trial.

Section

established

by a

A defendant who questions if venue

The prosecution must prove venue by a

preponderance of the evidence.
with

that

before

forth

These two sections work in harmony
clear

13

rules

for the

procedural

They clearly do not conflict, either on

handling of venue issues.
their face or in practice.
Flower's

assertion,

that

Section

76-1-202(2),

U.C.A.,

functions as a virtual mandatory rebuttable presumption of guilt on
the question of where an alleged offense occurred, is based upon
the

rationale

that

the

location

(Appellant's Brief, p. 5.)
are erroneous.

of

trial

relates

to

guilt.

However, this assertion and rationale

Venue does not determine guilt.

Venue

simply

determines the place where the trial may or should be held.
does not determine whether the law has been violated.

Venue
If the

defendant contests venue and loses, his or her guilt is still not
established.

Similarly, if the defendant contests venue and wins,

it does not establish his or her innocence.
U.C.A., pertains to procedure.
Furthermore,

contrary

Section 76-1-202(2),

It does not pertain to guilt.
to

Flower's

assertion,

Section

76-1-202(2), U.C.A., does not conflict with State

v.

Bailey,

282

P.2d 339 (Utah 1955).

In Bailey,

the

(Appellant's Brief, p. 5.)

jury was given instruction that in order to find the defendant
guilty of driving

under the influence,

it must

find

that

defendant's driving occurred in Garfield County as charged.
the testimony presented, the Supreme Court determined

the
From

it could

reasonably be inferred that the offense was committed in Garfield
County.

Bailey,

282 P.2d at 341.

Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A.,

does not relieve the prosecution from the burden of establishing
where

the offense

occurred.

But,

as was

found

in Bailey,

preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard.
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Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., and Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A.,
clearly

do

not

conflict.

Flower's

argument

is

based

on

the

incorrect legal principle that the venue statute deals with guilt.
POINT 5
THE VENUE PROVISIONS IN SECTION 76-1-202(1),
U.C.A., DO NOT RENDER SECTION 76-1-501(3),
U.C.A., UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF THE
REQUIREMENT THAT ALL OF THE FACTS CONSTITUTING
A CRIME MUST BE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The

mandatory

language

of

Section

76-1-202(1),

U.C.A.,

provides that "criminal actions shall be tried in the county or
district where the offense is alleged to have been committed."
(Emphasis added.)

In the present case, the information alleges

that the offense was committed in West Valley City; thus the case
was tried in the proper location.
Section

(R-16, 17; Exhibit C)

76-1-202(1), U.C.A., is a procedural

deals with venue.

section

that

It does not establish elements of crimes and

there is no language in the section that even mentions element of
crimes.

Flower's assertion that the intent of the legislature was

to make venue or proof of location of the crime an actual element
of the case is simply unsupported.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)

He

is forced to make this unsupported assertion in order to find a way
to argue that venue is an essential element of a criminal offense
so

that

he

can

challenge

the

constitutionality

76-1-202(1) and 76-1-501(3), U.C.A.

Flower cites In

of

Sections

re

Wlnship,

397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970), to show that
every fact necessary to constitute a crime must be proved beyond a
15

That proposition is certainly true; yet In

reasonable doubt.

Wlnshlp

re

is not applicable to venue, and thereon lies the fault with

Flower's argument.

Despite his assertion, it is without question

that venue is not a fact necessary to prove the crime, as described
in

In

re

Wlnshlp,

circumstantial
standard.
Mitchell,

State

and

evidence

that
on

v. Bailey,

a

venue

may

be

preponderance

established
of

the

by

evidence

282 P. 2d 339 (Utah 1955); State

v.

278 P.2d 618 (Utah 1955); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3).

Since venue is not an element of the offense, the due process
protections, as articulated in In

re

Wlnshlp,

are not violated.

Indeed, the Constitution does not require that venue be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.

See United

States

v.

Turner,

586 F.2d

395 (5th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 926, 99 S. Ct. 1258, 59
L. Ed. 2d 480 (1979).

Therefore, Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A.,

clearly does not relieve the government from any constitutional
burden.
Much of Flower's argument is based upon what he thinks the
Court of Appeals meant but failed to say in State
P.2d 466 (Ut. App. 1988).

v.

Sorenson,

Flower boldly states, "The only thing

that kept the Court of Appeals from saying, in Sorenson,
government

must

758

prove venue beyond

a reasonable

that the

doubt

is the

'preponderance of the evidence' language in U.C.A. 76-1-501(3)."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)

Contrary to Flower's assertion, the

Court of Appeals did not even address venue.

In Sorenson,

language of Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., was not in question.

the
In

fact, the Court of Appeals found that jurisdiction need not be
16

proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but, rather, by a preponderance
Sorenson,

of the evidence.
concern
evidence

in

Sorenson

of

was

jurisdiction

758 P . 2d at 470. The Court of Appeals'
that the state
but

relied

"put on absolutely

instead

entirely

on

no
the

presumption that the consumption of alcohol occurred within the
state."

Sorenson,

presumption

is

758 P.2d
that

in

at 470.

the

The problem with such a

specific

facts

of

that

case,

jurisdiction was bound up in a substantive element of the crime -namely, possession or consumption of alcohol within the state of
Utah

in

violation

of

state

law.

In

that

way,

it

became

a

presumption of guilt, thus creating a due process violation.
However, the instant case is significantly
from Sorenson

distinguishable

because venue, not jurisdiction, is in issue.

In the

instant case, there is no question that the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction.1

Also, no presumption concerning guilt is made in

the case at hand.

When objections to venue are waived, there still

must be a trial to establish guilt.

Section 76-1-501, U.C.A., does

not make venue an essential element of the crime, since the place
of trial does not affect the question of the defendant's guilt.
Consequently, Section 76-1-202(2), U.C.A., in no way shifts the
burden of proving guilt from the prosecution to the defendant.
It is clear that Section 76-1-202(1), U.C.A., does not render
Section 76-1-501(3), U.C.A., violative of the standard articulated
in In re

Wlnship

that every fact necessary to constitute the crime

In the case at hand, the charge was a violation of Section 41-6-44, U.C.A., "Driving under the
influence of alcohol," and Section 41-6-45, U.C.A., "Reckless driving." Both charges are misdemeanors which
are unquestionably within the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of this state to try.

17

I

I

need be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Flower's argument is

based on unsupported assumptions and should be disregarded.

Venue

is

by

not

an

element

of

an

offense

and

can

be

proved

a

preponderance of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons advanced above, judicial notice was properly
taken by the trial court establishing venue by a preponderance of
the evidence, and the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion
for Order Arresting Judgment should be affirmed in all respects.
DATED this

f£)

day of July, 1993.

WEST VALLEY CITY

".\ Richard Catten
Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-202

Exhibit A

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201

Exhibit B

Information (R-16, 17)

Exhibit C

Findings, Conclusions, and Order
on Defendant's Motion for Order
Arresting Judgment (R-80 - R-84)

Exhibit D

Exhibit A

PART 2
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
76-1-202. Venue of actions.
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county or district where the offense is alleged to have been committed. In determining the proper place of
trial, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is
consummated within this state, the offender shall be tried in the county
where the offense is consummated.
(b) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or results t h a t
constitute elements, whether the conduct or result constituting elements
is, in itself, unlawful, shall occur in two or more counties, trial of the
offense may be held in any of the counties concerned.
(c) If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is
located in one county and his victim is located in another county at the
time of the commission of the offense, trial may be held in either county.
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county and death ensues in
another county, the offender may be tried in either county.
(e) A person who commits an inchoate offense may be tried in any
county in which any act that is an element of the offense, including the
agreement in conspiracy, is committed.
(f) Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid another in the planning or commission of an offense in
another county, he may be tried for the offense in either county.
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and it cannot be
readily determined in which county or district the offense occurred, the
following provisions shall be applicable:
(i) When an offense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle,
watercraft, or aircraft passing within this state, the offender may be
tried in any county through which such railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft has passed.
(ii) When an offense is committed on any body of water bordering
on or within this state, the offender may be tried in any county
adjacent to such body of water. The words "body of water" shall include but not be limited to any stream, river, lake, or reservoir,
w h e t h e r natural or man-made.
(iii) A person who commits theft may be tried in any county in
which he exerts control over the property affected.
(iv) If an offense is committed on or near the boundary of two or
more counties, trial of the offense may be held in any of such counties.
(v) For any other offense, trial may be held in the county in which
t h e defendant resides, or, if he has no fixed residence, in the county in
which he is apprehended or to which he is extradited.
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless made before trial.

Exhibit B

ARTICLE II.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice cf adjudicative
facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request
may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
if) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.
(g) I n s t r u c t i n g j u r y . In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may. but is not required to, accept
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.

Exhibit C

Keith L. Stoney (3868)
City Prosecutor
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
(801) 963-3331
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH (WVC)

Plaintiff,

I N F O R M A T I O N
Case No. 925013jfoiTC

FLOWER, GROVER LAWRENCE
4256 SOUTH WHIPORWHOOL ST
WVC, UTAH 84120
6/30/61
Defendant.
The undersigned, KEITH L. STONEY, under oath, states on
information and belief that the defendant, on or about 15 NOVEMBER,
1992, at the vicinity of 3596 WEST 3100 SOUTH, West Valley City,
Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of:
COUNT Is

DUI, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, 41-6-44, U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, by driving or being in actual physical control
of a vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol
content of .08% or greater by weight or while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs.

COUNT 2:

RECKLESS DRIVING, a Class B Misdemeanor, 41-6-45, U.C.A.
1953, as amended, by operating any vehicle in willful or
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.

This information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witnesses:
OFFICER BLACK
OFFICER SANDQUIST
CHAD M. PETERSEON
COLLEEN HANSEN
KEITH D. LAYTON
TROOPER MCGREGOR

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this information on the following:
WITNESSES STATE THAT THE DEFENDANT drove or was in actual physical
control of a vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content
of .08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of
alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree which rendered the defendant incapable of safely
driving said vehicle; DEFENDANT OPERATED HIS MOTOR VEHICLE WITH
WILLFUL OR WANTON DISREGARD FOR THE PROPERTY OR SAFETY OF OTHERS. .
Complainant

92020636, MG, FLOWER.G
PTC: 8 JANUARY, 1992, 9:00 A.M.
January 8, 1993
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J. Richard Catten (#4291)
Senior Attorney
WEST VALLEY CITY
36 00 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, Utah 84119
(801)963-3271

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH (WVC),
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR ORDER ARRESTING JUDGMENT

v.
Case No. 925013701 TC
GROVE L. FLOWER,
Judge William A. Thome
Defendant•
Defendant Grove L. Flower having presented a Motion for Order
Arresting Judgment pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Court received written memoranda in support
and in opposition to the Motion. The parties also appeared before
the Court in oral argument on the Motion on February 18, 1993, with
Robert B. Breeze appearing for the Defendant and J. Richard Catten
appearing for the prosecuting agency, West Valley City. The Court,
upon review of the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, authorities,
and arguments of the parties, and being fully advised in the
premises, hereby makes and enters the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order with respect to Defendant's Motion
for Order Arresting Judgment.

to

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Section

Defendant was charged, by Information, with violation of
41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated

influence

of

alcohol,"

and

(UCA),

Section

"Driving under the

41-6-45,

UCA,

"Reckless

driving."
2.

The matter was heard as a bench trial

in the Third

Circuit Court, West Valley Department, on January 13, 1993, before
the Honorable William A. T h o m e .
3.

Two

witnesses

were

presented

by

the

prosecution

—

Colleen Hansen, a private citizen, and Officer Black, a West Valley
City Police Department Patrol Officer.

The defense presented no

witnesses.
4.

At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence and

arguments, the Court found the Defendant guilty of driving under
the influence of alcohol and not guilty of reckless driving.
5.

On or about January 21, 1993, Defendant filed a Motion

for Order Arresting Judgment and accompanying affidavits, pursuant
to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
6.

On or about February 9, 1993, Plaintiff filed a Response

to Motion for Order Arresting Judgment.
7.

At

oral

argument

on

February

18,

1993,

the

parties

stipulated on the record, and the Court finds the following:
a.

Neither witness directly testified that the offense
of driving under the influence occurred within the
limits of West Valley City.
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b.

Witness Hansen

testified that the offense occurred

at her place of employment, which was located at
3596 West 3100 South.
8.

The Court is familiar with the location of the address of

3596 West 3100 South and knows it to be within West Valley City
limits.

The address is unique, and there is not another 3596 West

3100 South within Salt Lake County.

The Court further finds that

3596 West 3100 South is not located near the border of West Valley
City or any other jurisdiction; but, rather, is located near the
center of West Valley City.
9.

The address of 3596 West 3100 South is generally known

within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court to be within West
Valley City.
10.

The Court, based upon the address evidence presented by

Witness Hansen, took judicial notice at the time of the trial that
the address of 3596 West 3100 South is located within West Valley
City.

The Court gave little weight

to the evidence that the

arresting officer was a West Valley City officer.
11.

The Court, at the time of the trial, did not luaku aoLo or

place on the record that the Court had taken judicial notice that
the address was within West Valley City.

3

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that a

court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts wnich are not
subject to reasonable dispute and which are generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
2.

It is not subject to reasonable dispute that the address

of 3596 West 3100 South is generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Court as being within West Valley City limits.

ORDER
Based

upon

the

foregoing,

Defendant's

Motion

for

Order

Arresting Judgment is denied.

DATED this

^^7

day of

Z2^'-+~

C—^

William A / Thorne •
Third Circuit Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Robert B. Br^Rg_r ftsg.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, the undersigned, certify that on the
day of
March, 1993, I mailed (postage prepaid) a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Findings, Conclusions, and Order on Defendant's
Motion for Order Arresting Judgment to the following party:
Robert B. Breeze, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
211 East 300 South, #215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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